



# How Much Help?

— PUBLIC CAMPAIGN FINANCING —  
AND LATINO CANDIDATES



A NALEO Educational Fund Report ★ April 2008



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## ABOUT THE NALEO EDUCATIONAL FUND

The National Association of Latino Elected and Appointed Officials (NALEO) Educational Fund is the leading national organization that empowers Latinos to participate fully in the American political process, from citizenship to public service. The NALEO Educational Fund carries out its mission through programs that promote the civic engagement of Latinos, provide technical assistance and professional development to the nation's Latino elected officials, and disseminate research on issues important to the Latino population. The NALEO Educational Fund is a non-partisan 501(c)(3) organization whose constituency includes the more than 6,000 Latino elected and appointed officials nationwide.

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
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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

**How has public campaign financing affected Latino candidates?** Has it encouraged more of them to run? Has it helped more Latinos win? Advocates contend that the government money does both, since it tends to create greater balance in campaign expenditures. Yet the real-world answers to these questions are complex and, so far, largely unexplored.

**This report analyzes the impact of public financing on Latino candidates in three jurisdictions—Arizona, Los Angeles, and New York City—using data analysis and interviews.** Arizona fully funds qualified candidates through its “clean elections” program, and Los Angeles and New York partially fund them with matching programs. Among other conclusions, the report finds that:

- **Of the three programs, full funding in Arizona created the most positive sentiment among Latino elected officials, and seemed to increase the number of Latino candidates.** Partial funding in Los Angeles and New York yielded more ambiguous results, partly because of confounding variables such as redistricting and term limits. Though New York offers six-to-one funding and covers a much greater share of the average successful Latino’s campaign costs than Los Angeles, these two programs seemed to differ little in impact.
- **It is unclear whether public financing alone has increased the number of Latino elected officials in any jurisdiction.**
- **In all three jurisdictions, most candidates now rely on public financing.** However, most Latino candidates also avoided it in its first year.
- **The main drawback for candidates involved costly and time-consuming reporting requirements in certain jurisdictions.** Complaints were most severe in New York, where candidates spent a large amount of their campaign funds on reporting and compliance.
- **Public financing has done little to offset the advantage of wealthy candidates.**
- **Independent expenditures now play a major role in campaign financing,** though so far they do not seem to have impaired Latino candidacies in these three jurisdictions.
- **Further research is critical on a wide range of questions.** For instance, it is essential to separate the effects of public financing from those of incumbency, redistricting, and other factors. It is important to compare jurisdictions with public financing to those without, to assess relative impact. Researchers should also further investigate issues such as the key variables that affect a Latino candidate’s decision to run for office.



# INTRODUCTION



## INTRODUCTION

Campaign financing reform has been a major issue in the last two decades and many observers predicted it would help open the road for qualified Latino candidates. Yet so far few scholars have investigated its success in this area. Though they have extensively examined the advantages and drawbacks of campaign financing reform in general, they have shed little light on this oft-cited goal.

The topic is complicated and this report seeks to begin to fill the gap, to identify what we may know and what we need to know better. It statistically analyzes the progress of Latino candidates in programs in three key jurisdictions—Arizona, Los Angeles, and New York City—and conveys their experience of running for office with public funding. It also suggests how political scientists and researchers can add to the body of knowledge.

### THE IMPORTANCE OF CAMPAIGN FUNDS

People have worried about the role of money in American elections at least since George Washington ran for the Virginia House of Burgesses in 1757, when critics charged he gave the average voter over a quart and a half of liquor (Center for Responsive Politics, 2007). But typically the money has flowed the other way, from citizens to candidates. Indeed, campaign contribution abuse became notorious in the 19th century and inspired Mark Twain’s comment: “I think I can say, and say with pride, that we have legislatures that bring higher prices than any in the world.” Overall, concern about the potential influence of campaign dollars has prompted calls for reform throughout U.S. history (Phelps, 2004).

As U.S. borders expanded and costly media like television grew more pervasive, candidates needed more and more cash to mount successful campaigns. In the last three decades, the average spent on successful U.S. House campaigns has grown at twice the rate of inflation. In 1990 it was \$408,000 (and the most expensive campaign cost \$1.7 million); by 2006 the sum had more than tripled to \$1.3 million (Center for Responsive Politics). Similarly, in 1990 winning candidates for the U.S. Senate raised an average of \$3.9 million; by 2006, it was \$9.6 million (Center for Responsive Politics). Campaign costs are spiraling upward at the state and municipal levels too, and in 2003-2004 state legislative candidates alone raised \$758 million nationwide (Roth Barber, 2006). In 2005, candidates for mayor in Los Angeles raised a combined \$14.7 million for the primary and general elections (Los Angeles City Ethics Commission, 2005), while in New York City the same year, the two main candidates for mayor spent an incredible \$93,752,620 combined in the general election. Though these sums are atypical—wealthy candidates inflated them beyond the standard single-digit millions in these cities—they show the potential, and it can only grow.

The benefits of funding in the quest for office are clear: More and better publicity, polls, staffing, and expertise, and a greater sense of viability. The bigger a candidate's bankroll, the more effectively she can reach voters. Indeed, successful candidates typically raise and spend more than their opponents (Hogan, 2004). For instance, in the 2000 congressional elections, "the candidate who raised the most money won 94 percent of the time" (Phelps, 2004). In 2006, while the average House winner spent \$1.3 million, the average loser spent half that amount, around \$622,000 (Center for Responsive Politics). The pattern is similar at the state level. In Arizona's 1998 state elections, for example, the best-funded candidate won 79 percent of all contests (Levin, 2006). As a result, some suggest that elections have become fundraising contests as much as quests for people's hearts and minds.

## THE IMPLICATIONS IN A DEMOCRACY

The increasing need for campaign donations raises several concerns. Since many state and local positions as well as the U.S. House of Representatives have terms of just two years, officials face frequent reelection and hence have a near-constant need to raise funds. Some have noted that the time they spend fundraising to keep their jobs is time they fail to spend actually doing their jobs (Fenno, 1978).

A second concern relates to the potential for corruption, or its appearance, which may in turn depress voter turnout (Levin, 2006). Some observers claim history suggests that elected officials reliant on wealthy donors may support measures that benefit those donors (e.g. Hess, 2003; Nemeroff, 2006). Third, some advocates claim the need for large private funding makes elections less competitive in several ways (Levin, 2006):

- It favors incumbents: They have well-established fundraising networks to tap at campaign time and can generate large war chests of cash that deter challengers (Hogan, 2001). They also gain from partisan polarization in the district, name recognition, and greater access to media and resources (Abramowitz, Alexander & Gunning, 2006). As a result of such factors, they almost always win reelection.
- It favors the very rich: Wealthy politicians like Michael Bloomberg enjoy an advantage, since they can contribute to their own campaigns and outspend opponents with even the bestfundraising records.
- It deters able candidates in general: The pressure to raise huge sums may keep many competent, viable candidates from emerging (Hogan, 2001; Sanbonmatsu, 2002; Phelps, 2004).

All these factors may disproportionately affect people traditionally underrepresented in elected office, such as women and ethnic or racial minorities, who tend to lack access to established political elites and fundraising structures, or the personal wealth to compete independently (Levin, 2006).

Indeed, the gap between the demographic makeup of our nation and its elected leadership is well documented. Only 79 women, 43 African-Americans, six Asian/Pacific Islanders, and 28 Latinos served in the 109th Congress (U.S. Census Bureau, 2007). Latinos are 5 percent of this body, yet 15 percent of the nation's population. Diversity at the state level is only marginally better. In 2007-2008, women comprised one third or more of state legislators in just five states, and overall, African-Americans and Latinos are underrepresented relative to their share of state populations (Donovan, Mooney & Smith, 2008). Not only is a more representative leadership an honorable goal,

but it makes our democracy more responsive and resilient. The more minorities who appear on the ballot, the higher minority voter turnout (Barreto, 2007) and in the case of Latinos, the less the political alienation (Pantoja & Segura, 2003).

## THE STRUCTURE OF THIS REPORT

To examine how campaign finance reform has affected Latino candidates, this document will first recount the history of campaign finance reform and review research on some of the benefits supporters claim, especially increased competition and diversity.

It will then examine the impact of campaign reform in three jurisdictions: Arizona, New York City, and Los Angeles. While many states and local entities use public financing, these three offer several advantages. First, each has a distinct form of public financing. Arizona uses full public financing of all legislative and statewide offices, while Los Angeles provides one-to-one matching funds and New York six-to-one (see Appendices 1 and 2 for details). Second, each has a unique government structure (Appendix 3). Third, Latinos comprise a large share of the populace in each (Appendix 3), and hence the impact of public financing on Latino candidates stands out more clearly.

For each jurisdiction, this report will address both quantitative and qualitative aspects of the issue, that is, statistics and immediate experience. The quantitative section will focus on the number of Latinos running before and after public financing, their success rate, and the amounts they raised and spent when in the program. The qualitative portion derives from original interviews with Latino elected officials and campaign finance experts, and conveys their firsthand experience and insights.

Finally, this report discusses the findings overall and highlights questions and issues for further research.



— CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM —  
FROM CAPS TO CLEAN MONEY



# — CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM —

## FROM CAPS TO CLEAN MONEY

### CONTRIBUTION LIMITS: RESTRICTING LARGE DONATIONS

Several movements toward campaign finance reform have occurred in American history, such as that following the Teapot Dome Scandal in the 1920s. However, modern times brought the first truly significant legislation: the Federal Elections Campaign Act (FECA) of 1971. With modifications in 1974, 1976, and 1979, FECA laid the foundation of reform. It placed caps on contributions—who can give and how much—and, originally, campaign outlays—how much a candidate can spend (Patrick, et al., 2000). It also required more regular financial filings with the Federal Election Commission (FEC) and greater public disclosure of contributions and expenditures.

However, a landmark Supreme Court ruling in 1976 abridged FECA and set the benchmark for all future attempts at reform. On the one hand, the Court upheld the contribution limits in FECA. On the other, it interpreted campaign spending as political self-expression and therefore held that key outlay provisions unconstitutionally restricted free speech. Specifically, it found that “the First Amendment requires invalidation of the Act’s independent expenditure ceiling, its limitations on a candidate’s expenditures from his own personal funds, and its ceilings on overall campaign expenditures.” (*Buckley v. Valeo*, 424 U.S. 1 (1976)). The Court upheld *Buckley* in *Randall v. Sorrell* as recently as 2006, finding Vermont’s spending limits an unconstitutional violation of the First Amendment (Coleman, 2006). As a result, most traditional reforms limit only the front-end of the financing process—the contributions—and not expenditures. Wealthy candidates can continue to fund their own campaigns and ceilings on independent expenditures must not be too low.

After FECA, the next large-scale attempt at federal campaign finance reform was the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) of 2002, commonly known as the McCain-Feingold Act. Among other goals, such as a ban on “soft money” contributions—funds given to state and local parties or committees—for federal campaign activities, it sought to reduce the advantage that *Buckley* conferred on wealthy candidates. The “Millionaire Provision” of BCRA still allows candidates to donate unlimited amounts to their own campaigns, but it raised the contribution limits for their opponents (Hess, 2003). The Millionaire Provision kicks in when a candidate gives herself over \$350,000 in a House race or \$1.5 million (plus \$0.40 for each voting-age person in the state) in a Senate race (Federal Election Commission).

Many limitation-oriented federal measures like FECA and BCRA have served as models for reform at the state level, to varying degrees (Nemeroff, 2006). Proponents say they have helped minimize actual or perceived corruption, reduce donors’ direct influence on candidates, and make the funding process more transparent (Nemeroff, 2006). As one observer notes regarding the first issue:

If corruption is based upon the notion that people make contributions in exchange for policy and legislation favorable to their interests, then it follows that influence-peddling should diminish as the amount of private contributions decreases. Even if actual legislative vote-buying through campaign contributions does not take

place—and certainly such forms of explicit corruption are rare and difficult to prove—a reduction in the amount of private money to campaigns reduces or eliminates the appearance that a campaign contribution buys favorable policy or increased access to a legislator. (Levin, 2006, p. 5)

Despite dramatic variance among federal, state, and local measures, most simply place a lid on the amount or source of contributions. While this strategy addresses key concerns, many argue it fails to mitigate other ills: real or apparent corruption, the ever-escalating cost of campaigns, the lack of competitiveness, and low diversity of candidate pools. Indeed, candidates still need massive fundraising to win office, and costs continue to skyrocket. As such, in recent years many more are looking to public financing as a more comprehensive solution to these troubles.

## **PUBLIC FINANCING: COUNTERING THE WAR CHEST**

In addition to capping contributions, public financing involves actively channeling monies from the government to candidates, potentially reducing the need for a candidate to solicit private contributions. Varied forms of public financing are already in place in certain jurisdictions, and in some cases have been for over 30 years. In 1974, as part of FECA, Congress established the Public Election Campaign Fund (PECF), a system by which people can contribute to a general presidential campaign fund through their federal income tax returns (Corrado, 2000). The program provides matching funds to candidates in the primaries and general election (for contributions of \$250 or less). Candidates qualify by raising at least \$5,000 in 20 states, in amounts up to \$250. Since 1976, when the law took effect, almost all serious presidential contenders have accepted these funds for both primaries and general election (Patrick, Pious & Ritchie, 2000).

In the wake of PECF, several states and local jurisdictions also adopted public financing. The earliest were Minnesota, Maryland, and New Jersey in 1974, and Seattle followed in 1978, though it later repealed the measure (Levin, 2006). Today, 25 states and 13 local jurisdictions use some public campaign financing, and many more are considering doing so (Levin, 2006).

These programs come in many forms, but there are two basic models: partial and full funding.

The most common is the partial or “matching fund” program like PECF, in which candidates who meet certain qualifications receive publicly-funded dollars for each privately-donated dollar (up to a pre-set amount). By participating, candidates agree to limitations, such as on sources of contribution, the maximum raised, total expenditures, and use of personal funds.

The second type is the full public financing or “clean money” program, which defrays all campaign expenses. Like matching programs, these are voluntary and available to qualified candidates who show a broad base of support and agree to certain fundraising and spending caps (Lerner, 2007). “Clean money” initiatives aim to eliminate any conflict of interest that might arise from accepting large private contributions. They thereby seek to improve voters’ faith in the political process, boost voter turnout, and—most significantly—improve competition by leveling the playing field for political newcomers and those unable to contribute personal wealth to their own campaign.

The benefits claimed for public campaign financing are very appealing, and most research has found few downsides to these programs. However, the picture regarding competition and diversity is more complex.

## BOOST OR BUST: LATINOS AND THE QUESTION OF CANDIDATE DIVERSITY

So far, little research has addressed the question of whether campaign finance reform leads to more Latinos seeking and winning office. Only one study has directly probed this matter. Raymond La Raja of the University of Massachusetts, Amherst, recently surveyed identified potential viable candidates in Connecticut. His preliminary findings indicate that raising money is the paramount concern for candidates for the state legislature, with 87 percent of respondents citing it.

Additionally, 27 percent stated that the availability of public funds would heighten their chances of running—and, significantly, the most prominent demographic in this group was non-whites with incomes under \$50,000 (La Raja, 2007, complete report forthcoming as of this writing). The latter finding receives some support from another study, which showed that most candidates overall rate the availability of significant funding as the chief factor in the decision to run (Maisel, Stone & Maestas, 2001). Although further work is obviously needed, these results suggest that public financing may enhance electoral competition and diversity by providing opportunities to more candidates, particularly Latinos.

Much other evidence is indirect, and involves the impact of campaign financing reform on the field of challengers.

### TAILWIND FOR ALL CHALLENGERS?

Though few public financing programs explicitly cite increasing candidate diversity as a primary goal, some advocates argue that any reform that enables more challengers to run will increase competitiveness and therefore candidate diversity, since incumbents enjoy such high retention rates (Jacobson, 1987). Although greater electoral competitiveness alone does not yield improved ethnic or racial diversity in elected leadership—and may under certain conditions have the opposite effect—some say it is the principal means by which public financing can result in greater diversity. The logic behind this conclusion is that public financing reduces the financial advantage of incumbents, and thus not only increases the pool of viable challengers, but especially benefits those candidates from historically underrepresented groups who may otherwise lack the financial resources and connections to mount meaningful challenges.

Overall, competition in elected office has decreased. Successful challenges to sitting U.S. Representative positions, for instance, have declined over the last 50 years. In the 2002-2004 election cycles, 99 percent of incumbents won reelection, up from 94 percent for the period from 1952 to 1980 (Abramowitz, Alexander & Gunning, 2006). This trend is also occurring at the state and local level (Holbrook & Tidmarch, 1991). Even when controlling for such incumbent advantages as name recognition and better access (Fenno, 1978), the large sums of cash incumbents can raise deter viable candidates from mounting challenges (Hogan, 2001). After advanced analysis of several decades of data, one report found that “declining competition in U.S. House elections is explained by two major factors: a shift in the partisan composition of House districts and *a decline in the ability of challengers to compete financially with incumbents*” (Abramowitz, Alexander & Gunning, 2006) [emphasis added]. Although scholars may disagree about the means by which incumbents gain their financial edge, no one doubts that it exists (Hogan, 2001).

Since funding seems important in motivating individuals to run, one could infer that the accessibility of public funds would lure in some candidates who might otherwise sit on the sidelines. Does it? To what extent does public financing lessen the incumbent’s advantage and make elections more competitive?

The evidence suggests a positive influence, but it is not unambiguous. In fact, some argue that regulating contributions actually makes political races less competitive, and may shrink the pool of candidates (Lott, 2006). Other research implies that there is little proof public financing heightens competition (Mayer & Wood, 1995). However, several studies indicate that reform may enable challengers to gain more campaign funding. One analysis of state legislative races suggests that “public financing leads to higher levels of challenger spending,” though along with contribution caps it may help cut campaign outlays for incumbents (Hogan, 2000, p. 1). Similar trends appear at the gubernatorial level: Campaign finance laws have helped cut spending by incumbents, but less so by challengers (Bardwell, 2003). In the City of Los Angeles, which has had a matching funds program since 1990, the spending gap between Council incumbents and challengers narrowed through 1999, but widened in 2005 (Los Angeles City Ethics Commission, 2006).

To whatever extent partial funding improves competitiveness, one might expect full public financing to improve it more. Recent research on two states with such programs—Maine and Arizona—suggests that it may lead to modest gains. In the Arizona legislature, 98 percent of incumbents won reelection in 1998, while only 75 percent did in 2002 after public financing took effect (Mayer, Werner & Williams, 2005). This decline occurred along with an increase in average candidate spending in the 2000-2002 elections compared to 1996-1998, before full public financing (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2003). Examining additional election cycles, investigators found that public funding in Maine and Arizona has continued to yield further competition, although not dramatically (Werner & Mayer, 2007).

### ***FROM COMPETITIVENESS TO DIVERSITY***

Although public financing seems to increase competitiveness, this fact does not necessarily translate into increased diversity in leadership. Indeed, non-fundraising factors are clearly important, and “status as a member of a group historically excluded from politics depresses the likelihood of considering candidacy” (Fox & Lawless, 2005, p. 1). In addition, increased competitiveness—whether from public financing or other factors such as term limits—may in fact cause Latino incumbents to lose office.

So does public financing lead to more minority candidates? There is evidence to suggest that it may. In the 2001 New York municipal elections, the Campaign Finance Program

attracted the largest number of participants in the history of the Program. As a result, the electorate saw an even more diverse selection of candidates in a city where diversity is well established. New immigrant voices emerged from the Asian-American and Russian-American communities, among others. (New York City Campaign Finance Board, 2002, p. 3)

Arizona’s 2002 state elections saw a near threefold increase in the number of Native-American and Latino candidates, and the matching program in the City of Los Angeles has “gone a long way toward increasing the number and diversity of candidates running in and winning City elections” (Levin, 2006, p. 61).

However, while such changes signal movement toward greater ethnic diversity in elected leadership, other causes may also have contributed, such as redistricting and term limits. It remains difficult to isolate the impact of campaign financing reform on these gains, and the examples of Arizona, New York City, and Los Angeles will show how closely potential causes weave together.

— ARIZONA: —

“CLEAN ELECTIONS” AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES



# ARIZONA:


## “CLEAN ELECTIONS” AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES

### THE STATE AND ITS GOVERNMENT

Latinos have been an integral part of Arizona’s population and culture since long before statehood in 1912. Yet they did not become a major portion of the state until recently. From 1990 to 2006, the number of Latinos surged 68 percent, and these 1.1 million new residents accounted for nearly half the state’s total growth (NALEO Educational Fund, 2008). Today, nearly 3 in 10 Arizonans, or 29 percent, are Latino (U.S. Census Bureau, 2006).

Latino representation in the state legislature has also grown steadily over the last decade. Figure 1 shows the number of Latinos serving in the legislature and in statewide elected office from 1987 to the present. The legislature has 30 districts, each with one Senator and two Representatives, for a total of 30 Senators and 60 Representatives. In 1987-1988, there were only five Latinos in the House (8 percent). However, since 1997 the number steadily climbed to 12 in 2005-2006, or one in five (20 percent). One Latino also served in a statewide office from 2002 to 2003, as Superintendent of Public Instruction, but he was appointed to the position after his predecessor resigned. Overall, Latinos remain underrepresented statewide.


**Figure 1**  
**Latinos in Elected Office**



*See Sources and Methodology for more information.*

As the number of Latino elected officials has grown, so has the number of candidates, and in each election since 2000 at least 23 Latinos have vied for all state-level offices combined (Figure 2). However, this increase is primarily due to the greater number of Latinos running for the State Senate. The number of Latino candidates for the House has generally declined since 2000.

**Figure 2**  
**Latinos Running for State Office in Arizona**



*See Sources and Methodology for more information.*

### **LATINO PARTICIPANTS IN “CLEAN ELECTIONS”**

In November 1998, Arizona voters enacted the Citizens Clean Elections Act, which provides full public financing to qualifying candidates running for either branch of the legislature, as well as the statewide offices of mine inspector, corporate commissioner, attorney general, secretary of state, and governor (for more information, see Appendix 1). Prior to the Act, no public financing existed for state-level candidates in Arizona. This program may have helped increase the number of Latinos running for and elected to Arizona’s legislature (Levin, 2006).

The 2000 election cycle gave candidates their first chance to run in a “clean election,” but it was not widely embraced. While the total number of Latino candidates increased from 16 in 1998 to 24 in 2000, the majority of candidates—both Latino and non-Latino—ran “traditional” campaigns. Of the eight Latino incumbents running, only one took part (13 percent), and of the 16 non-incumbent Latino candidates, just five did (31 percent). Excluding the five non-incumbents, who may have decided to run because full public financing was available, the number of Latino state candidates in 2000 still exceeded that in 1998 by three (19 to 16). Given the low participation in the clean-elections program, it is hard to argue that clean elections completely accounted for the rise in candidate numbers in 2000, and, indeed, it is hard to determine the Act’s precise impact on them.


However, by 2002 far more candidates were participating in the program. The number and percentage of participating House candidates at least doubled, for both Latinos and non-Latinos. Since then, the majority of candidates have taken part in the program in every election (except for the State Senate in 2006, when only 38 percent of candidates did). Figure 3 shows the number of House candidates participating.

**Figure 3**  
**Primary Election Candidates and Clean Elections Participants,**  
**State House of Representatives**

	2000	2002	2004	2006
Total Running	223	247	195	211
Non-Latinos	203	229	117	197
Latinos	20	18	18	14
Total Participating	59	139	118	127
Non-Latinos	53	127	106	119
Latinos	6	12	12	8
Percentage Participating	26%	56%	61%	60%
Non-Latinos	26%	55%	60%	60%
Latinos	30%	67%	67%	57%

Interestingly, the number and percentage of Latinos in the program declined in 2006. Figure 4, which depicts the share of Latino legislative candidates in the clean elections program, highlights it, and also shows that the falloff was more pronounced among Latino State Senate candidates.

**Figure 4**  
**Share of Latino Candidates Participating**  
**in Clean Elections Program**




*See Sources and Methodology for more information.*

What explains the decline in Latino participation? One reason may be success in office and hence a lack of competition. In 2006, two of the 11 Latino incumbent candidates for the House ran unopposed and therefore could not participate in the program. More strikingly, three of the five Latino incumbent candidates for the State Senate ran unopposed, reducing participation from 63 percent in 2004 to 38 percent in 2006.

Similarly, while Arizona has seen more Latino candidates in state-level elections (Figure 2), they are not necessarily new Latino candidates. Figure 5, which shows the non-incumbent share of all Latino candidates in recent elections, suggests a reason why. In 2000, four out of five Latino House candidates were non-incumbents—the highest proportion in recent history. The share decreased in subsequent elections, and in 2006 less than one in three Latino candidates for the House and less than

four in ten for the Senate were non-incumbents. Although the total number of elected Latino state officials has risen significantly since before 2000 (Figure 1), this fact suggests few new opportunities are opening up for Latino candidates.

**Figure 5**  
**Non-Incumbent Share of All Latino Candidates**



*Note: All Latino Senate candidates in 1994, 1998, and 2000 were incumbents.*


*See Sources and Methodology for more information.*

## SUCCESS RATE OF LATINO CLEAN-ELECTIONS PARTICIPANTS

In theory, the clean elections program should help more Latinos ascend to office. In the 2000 race, when most competitors had seemed to hold it at arm’s length, its effect on Latino candidates was unclear. Three of the six clean-elections participants won office (50 percent). One was an incumbent and thus two of the five non-incumbent participants prevailed (40 percent), both gaining “non-Latino” open seats or districts Latinos had not been serving previously. However, three of the eleven Latino non-incumbents who ran “traditional” campaigns won election to the House (27 percent), and one succeeded to a “non-Latino” open seat (Representative Debora Norris, in District 11).


Figure 6 shows that, overall, the share of participating Latino candidates who have won election to the House has increased in the last three cycles. Given the smaller number of Latino Senate candidates, only four in 2000, the data is less clear. Just two Latinos have run for statewide office since the program began (neither of whom succeeded), making it impossible to draw any conclusions.

**Figure 6**  
**Share of Latinos Participating in Clean Elections Program Elected to Office**



*See Sources and Methodology for more information.*

Many factors beyond campaign finance—such as incumbency—may influence a candidate’s chance of winning. Figure 7 shows the success rate of Latino clean-election House candidates by incumbent status. Although limited by just four years of data, it shows that clean-election incumbents are more likely to succeed than their fellow clean-election non-incumbents.



*See Sources and Methodology for more information.*

Redistricting may also influence the number of Latinos elected to office. However, there have been only three election cycles with post-2000 decennial census districts and the clean elections program in effect, so it is impossible to analyze the impact of this variable using regression analyses. Several election cycles following 2012 there will be enough data for such analyses.

### “CLEAN ELECTIONS” AND THE MONEY FLOW

Although most legislative candidates now participate in the clean-elections program, many (including Latinos) still run “traditional” campaigns. Some have no choice, since the program bars candidates running unopposed from participating, and incumbents with nominal competition may find it easier to fundraise through private funding. Figure 8 shows the average raised and spent by Latino “traditional” candidates for the state legislature between 2000 and 2006. In 2004, only one traditional Latino candidate lost his bid for office, hence the very low figure, and in 2006 no traditional candidates lost. Note that the 2008 spending limit for state legislative candidates is \$12,291 for the primary and \$19,382 for the general election.

**Figure 8**  
**Average Latino “Traditional” Candidate Funds Raised and Spent, Candidates for State Legislature**

		2000	2002	2004	2006
Average Raised	Overall	\$12,191.84	\$14,156.22	\$13,938.40	\$15,979.05
	Winners	\$16,955.69	\$12,631.59	\$15,600.69	\$15,979.05
	Losers	\$7,427.99	\$16,062.00	\$3,964.62	n/a
Average Spent	Overall	\$10,994.21	\$11,216.52	\$11,508.58	\$12,778.68
	Winners	\$13,578.85	\$8,791.07	\$12,765.91	\$12,778.68
	Losers	\$8,040.33	\$14,248.33	\$3,964.62	n/a

*See Sources and Methodology for more information.*

How do these amounts compare to those granted to successful Latino clean-elections participants? Except in 2006, the successful Latino participants have received more money than successful traditional candidates, and in 2002 they obtained 60 percent more. The reason for this difference may lie in the fact that some incumbents confident of reelection do not participate. Predictably, unsuccessful Latino traditional candidates have raised much less than successful Latino participants.

**Figure 9**  
**Average Funds Obtained by Successful Latino Participants,**  
**Candidates for State Legislature**

Year	Primary Election Lump Sum	General Election Lump Sum	Total Lump Sum Available	Average Matched	Average Total Obtained
2000	\$10,000	\$15,000	\$15,000	\$4,830	\$17,330
2002	\$10,790	\$16,180	\$26,970	\$2,357	\$20,184
2004	\$11,320	\$16,980	\$28,300	\$2,778	\$16,170
2006	\$11,945	\$17,918	\$29,863	\$7,870	\$13,622
2008	\$12,291	\$19,382	\$31,673	n/a	n/a

*Note: 1) To receive the Total Lump Sum, candidates had to qualify and run opposed in both primary and general elections. 2) The Average Matched is the average for all successful Latino participants, regardless of whether they received matching funds or not. In comparison, Figure 11 shows the averages among Latino candidates who did receive matching funds. 3) The Average Total Obtained is the average for all successful Latino participants. The numbers are lower than the Total Lump Sum because some participants received the lump sum only for the primary or general election.*

*See Sources and Methodology for more information.*

The average amount spent by winning Latino traditional candidates is also interesting. On average, they spent several thousand dollars less than they raised, and these amounts approximately equaled—and in some years were less than—the funds granted to clean money candidates. However, candidates with opposition far outspent those unopposed, in both the primary and general elections (Figure 10).

**Figure 10**  
**Average Latino “Traditional” Candidate Funds Raised and Spent,**  
**Opposed and Unopposed Candidates for State Legislature**

		2000	2002	2004	2006
Average Raised	Opposed	\$17,720.16	\$12,659.32	\$26,593.00	\$22,131.37
	Unopposed	\$15,681.59	\$12,590.00	\$13,402.23	\$11,057.20
Average Spent	Opposed	\$14,690.61	\$8,317.45	\$23,787.29	\$20,434.37
	Unopposed	\$10,243.56	\$9,501.50	\$10,561.64	\$10,439.57

*See Sources and Methodology for more information.*

In addition to the lump sum that clean-elections candidates receive, they are also eligible for matching funds should non-participating opponent’s outlays exceed the clean-money spending limit, up to three times the limit (see Appendix 2 for more detail). For winning clean-elections Latino candidates (Figure 11), average matching funds have in some primary and general elections come close to the total spent by traditional candidates for the entire election cycle.

**Figure 11**  
**Average Matching Funds Received by Successful**  
**and Unsuccessful Latino Candidates for State Legislature**

		2000	2002	2004	2006
Average Primary Matching Funds	Won	\$18,013.80	\$13,998.09	\$21,009.74	\$4,471.98
	Lost	\$15,024.91	\$4,330.09	\$3,088.37	n/a
Average General Matching Funds	Won	\$10,965.49	\$5,000.00	\$7,248.16	\$14,062.87
	Lost	\$0.00	\$21,737.06	\$4,950.02	n/a

*Note: These are the average matching funds of Latino candidates who received some matching funds. They thus exceed the average matching funds in Figure 9, which are for all successful Latino candidates, including many who received no matching funds.*

*See Sources and Methodology for more information.*

In addition to candidate fundraising, there are other financial influences in state-level elections. Independent expenditures by non-candidate committees in Arizona have increased significantly since the start of the clean-elections program (GAO, 2003). Fortunately, state law requires some reporting of independent expenditures, including the entity making the expenditure, but not necessarily the candidate for or against whom the expenditure was made (King, 2007). The clean-elections program also entitles candidates to receive matching funds for independent expenditures made on behalf of an opponent, at any time prior to the election—even expenditures that are unreported. However, following *Buckley*, the state cannot limit independent expenditures. Additionally, Arizona law allows state parties to raise unlimited amounts of “soft money” and spend it on behalf of candidates (Levin, 2006). Thus far, such independent expenditures do not appear to have had a negative impact on Latino candidates.

## THE INSIDE STORY

Statistics can convey a program’s large-scale impact, but they may not reveal how it works in practice. Hence the perspectives of Latino participants are invaluable. Senator Richard Miranda—who also served in the State House for two terms, one before enactment of clean-elections and one after—represents the 13th District, which includes parts of Phoenix and neighboring communities. Although he did not participate in the program in his most recent election, he has in the past when, despite his political experience, he was unsure how much money he could raise as a traditional candidate. He feels that the program enables those relatively new to the process to fund a campaign, and that it may encourage people to run who might not otherwise do so—particularly those in ethnic minority-majority districts.

Other interviewees also felt that the program has encouraged viable candidates to run, including themselves. Senator Amanda Aguirre was first appointed to represent the 24th District in the Arizona House of Representatives in 2003. She won election to a full Senate term in 2004, and she believes the clean-elections program helped make it possible. As the first Latina and woman to represent her district, Senator Aguirre was particularly concerned with raising the money needed to win:

“I’m a working parent, and when I first decided to run my kids were in college. I had the time to do it, and was inspired to do it, so the program allowed me to say ‘Yes, let’s do it.’ The first year I had opposition from both sides—Democrats and Republicans—and mostly white males, so it made it kind of tough. But I think running with clean elections gave me the opportunity to do what I needed to do, and gave me the money to support me through the process, and get the word out there.”

Despite the political experience she gained in the House, Senator Aguirre also ran her second campaign for the Senate in 2006 as a clean-elections candidate, given the vigorous competition: “My last campaign was close to \$65-70,000, as I had very strong opposition. So it was a very tough race, a very close race, and I don’t think I would have done it without the clean elections.”

Unlike Senator Aguirre, Senator Rebecca Rios had already served three terms in the House (1994 to 2000) prior to clean-elections and her bid for the State Senate in 2004. Though she already had the connections and fundraising expertise, the competitiveness of her Senate opponent influenced her decision to participate:

“In this, my first Senate race, one of the contributing factors to me going clean was my opponent. Although he had never served in the legislature, his brother was serving in the legislature, and he had been a mayor of a community. He had already hired a consultant, so it was clear to me that he knew how to raise money. So it wasn’t as if I was going up against a novice that wouldn’t have any connections.”

Senator Rios also acknowledged that full public financing may have allowed more candidates to run, particularly those with the skills and passion to be effective representatives, yet without the experience to mount a traditionally funded campaign: “Had I not already had the connections and the expertise of fundraising, this clean-elections program would have been all the more important, for the obvious reason that when you’re the new guy on the team, you don’t have those relationships. It’s much more difficult to get them to fund you.” She also notes that after the program, there were “a lot more folks jumping into both primary and general races, whereas in the past you really didn’t have as much to choose from.” However, she adds, “The extent to which this has translated to more women and people of color serving in office, I don’t know.” She suggests the program may change this in time:

“I think it’s allowed more Latinos to run for office, and they’re running in districts where in the past they probably wouldn’t even have tried, because they wouldn’t have had the mechanisms to do the fundraising. But largely a lot of these districts... have never had Latino representation and continue to vote more Anglo. I think over time the demographics are changing to [become more Latino], and as a result, a lot of the folks who have run in the past, they’ve now kind of gotten their feet wet, and are able to come back and try again under clean elections, and I think even be victorious. I think it will pay off, as time goes on.”

Senator Richard Miranda echoed these sentiments: “I think in minority districts it [clean elections] has helped, but hasn’t necessarily increased the numbers here at the capitol.” He suggests that, though the program may have improved the diversity of the candidate pool, it alone may not suffice to change the makeup of the state’s legislature.

While all three elected officials spoke positively of the program, they all also noted minor downsides. Their concerns centered on administrative aspects of program compliance, specifically the detailed filing requirements. As Senator Aguirre says, “It’s a lot of work, and to get over 200 \$5 donations, get all their information, fill in the forms: it’s a lot of work.” This may be a potential concern for Latino candidates new to the process, or those unable to raise the limited “seed” funds allowed under the clean-elections program to hire professional staff. Although a candidate may be able to complete the administrative work herself—as Senator Aguirre did in her Senatorial election—the effort may consume a significant share of her time. First-time candidates may also find it extremely challenging. To help them all, the Citizens Clean Elections Commission (the governmental body that administers the program) now organizes workshops to walk-through the rules and requirements to candidates and their staff. However, the workshops provide no guidance as to how to run a campaign or deal with other state compliance rules.



— LOS ANGELES: —  
THE UPSHOT OF MATCHING FUNDS



# LOS ANGELES:

## THE UPSHOT OF MATCHING FUNDS


### THE CITY AND ITS GOVERNMENT

Los Angeles is the nation’s second largest city with 3.8 million residents. World famous for films and balmy weather, it has also become the second most diverse city in the United States and Latinos are almost a majority of the population. Close to half of its residents—1.8 million, or 49 percent—are now Latino (U.S. Census Bureau, 2006). Though Latinos have played a salient role in its history, the Latino share of the population has markedly outpaced the non-Latino only in the last few decades. In 1990, for instance, Latinos were 40 percent of the city (U.S. Census Bureau, 1990).

Latinos held top-tier positions in city government in its earliest days, but they vanished from municipal office for nearly a century and only recently returned in numbers that reflect their local presence. Thus, several Latinos served on the City Council after statehood in 1850, but not until 1949 did another Latino—Edward Roybal—take a seat on the Council (Schmal, 2005). Similarly, Cristobal Aguilar, a Latino, served as mayor of Los Angeles in the 19th century, but the next Latino mayor—Antonio Villaraigosa—did not take office until 130 years later.

However, Latinos still remain slightly underrepresented in municipal office. They hold five of the 15 City Council seats, although Latinos also serve as mayor and city attorney. To date, no Latino has ever been city controller. Figure 12 shows the Latinos in municipal government (excluding judges) since 1984.


**Figure 12**  
**Latinos Serving in Elected Municipal Office**



*See Sources and Methodology for more information.*

Latino candidates have also increased in recent years, with a high of 16 bidding for municipal office in 2005 (Figure 13). However, of those seeking seats on the City Council, only one was running for a seat not currently or previously held by a Latino Councilmember.

**Figure 13**  
**Latino Candidates for Elected Municipal Office**



*See Sources and Methodology for more information.*

## LATINO PARTICIPANTS IN THE MATCHING FUNDS PROGRAM

In 1992, Los Angeles voters approved a campaign finance reform package called Proposition H, which established partial-public financing for municipal candidates. Campaigns in Los Angeles are the costliest of the three jurisdictions considered in this report, and under the program, qualifying candidates for mayor, city attorney, controller, and City Council receive funds to match contributions \$1 for every \$1 raised, up to a limit (see Appendix 2 for more information).

Many advocates of public financing argue that it has been vital to improving the number of minority candidates, and viable candidates overall, in city elections (Levin, 2006). However, the number of Latinos running grew only slightly in 1993, the program's first election year. No significant increase occurred until 1999, when 13 Latinos ran for Council seats (Figure 13). Additionally, while 1993 saw the election of three Latinos to the Council, one more than in previous years, this number did not reach four until 2002 and five until 2004 (Figure 12).

The program has proved very popular and 78 percent of all candidates on average have taken part each year (see Figure 14). However, participation has varied from election to election and it declined considerably in 1995 and 2007, especially among Latinos. The Latino decrease in 1995 likely reflected the paucity of Latino candidates, which makes percentages less meaningful. But no clear explanation emerges for the falloff in 2007, when only two of the 14 Latinos running were incumbents and both faced opponents.


**Figure 14**  
**Primary Election Candidates and Matching Fund Program Participation, Municipal Races**

	1993	1995	1997	1999	2001	2003	2005	2007	Average
Total Running	71	23	27	41	76	26	45	34	43
Non-Latinos	63	20	20	28	63	21	29	20	33
Latinos	8	3	7	13	13	5	16	14	10
Total									
Participating	58	14	22	36	70	23	33	19	34
Non-Latinos	51	13	17	23	58	20	21	12	27
Latinos	7	1	5	13	12	3	12	7	8
Share									
Participating	82%	61%	81%	88%	92%	88%	73%	56%	78%
Non-Latinos	81%	65%	85%	82%	92%	95%	72%	60%	79%
Latinos	88%	33%	71%	100%	92%	60%	75%	50%	71%

*See Sources and Methodology for more information.*

Of note is the popularity of Los Angeles' matching program among non-Latinos. With the exception of 1993, 1999, and 2005, an equal or greater percentage of non-Latino than Latino candidates have participated in each election (Figure 15).

**Figure 15**  
**Latino Candidates for Elected Municipal Office Participating in Matching Fund Program**




*See Sources and Methodology for more information.*

How has incumbency influenced Latino candidates' participation in the program? As in Arizona, incumbent candidates may not take part if they lack genuine opposition and may decide not to if they are confident of reelection. Both factors would clearly lower the percentage of participant candidates in an election. Thus in 2005 no incumbent Latino candidate chose to participate. Two of the Latino City Councilmembers ran unopposed, as did City Attorney Rocky Delgadillo. Another Council incumbent, Ed Reyes, declined to participate in the face of only modest competition.

With many advocates suggesting the matching program has led to more minority candidates, it is important to compare the percentage of Latino incumbents versus non-incumbents in the races. Figure 16 shows the non-incumbent share of all Latino candidates for City Council. It declines from 1981 to 1997, a period which includes three elections after the matching program took effect, and by 1997 just three in five Latino candidates (60 percent) were non-incumbents. This trend halted abruptly in 1999 when all 13 Latinos running were non-incumbents and participated in the program. While the percentage of Latino non-incumbents has since declined, it remains above the levels of 1995 and 1997. In addition, many more Latino candidates are running in municipal elections than before the matching program.

**Figure 16**  
**Non-Incumbent Share of Latino Candidates for City Council**




*Note: In 1989, no Latino non-incumbents ran for City Council.  
 See Sources and Methodology for more information.*

### SUCCESS RATE OF LATINO PARTICIPANTS

How have Latino participants fared in elections? Figure 17 shows that their success rose unevenly to peak in 2003 and since then has been far lower. Note that, in most years, a Latino participant outperformed rivals in at least half the districts with Latino candidates. But there are significant exceptions. In 1995, Latino candidates ran in two districts and both winners were non-participating Latino incumbents. The low numbers in 2005 and 2007 indicate that Latino participants fared poorly against either non-Latinos or Latino non-participants.


**Figure 17**  
**Latino Candidates Participating in Matching Program Elected to City Council**



*Note: In 1995, no Latino candidates participating in the program were elected to City Council.  
 See Sources and Methodology for more information.*

Figure 18 may explain the reduced success of Latino participants in 2005 and 2007. The number of incumbent Latino candidates either unable or unwilling to participate jumped significantly in these years. Additionally, although a non-incumbent Latino participant won one race in each of the two election cycles, both were open seats in districts previously held by a Latino—not districts in which the Latino successfully challenged an incumbent or a non-Latino had held office.

**Figure 18**  
**Number of City Council Districts Won by Latino Candidates**



*See Sources and Methodology for more information.*

However, Latinos have steadily increased their presence on the Council, from two in 1991 to five in 2003. The extent to which the matching program led to these increases is unclear, for varied reasons. One is redistricting. In 1992, City Council districts were redrawn, resulting in the new District 7 with a larger Latino population, creating a more favorable political environment for Latino candidates. It became the third district to elect a Latino Councilmember. Redistricting did not play a role in 2001, but it may have again in 2003. Term limits were not at issue in 1993, since they did not come into being until 1995, when Los Angeles voters limited municipal elected officials to two terms. However, they may have played a role in the surge of candidates for Council in 1999 and 2001 (Figure 13).


The matching program did not have a one-to-one causal relationship to Latino candidate success, but it may have exercised influence. For instance, no non-incumbent Latino candidate has won election without matching funds since 1993.

## MATCHING FUNDS AND THE MONEY FLOW

Municipal officials in Los Angeles have huge constituencies. Citywide officials represent over 3.7 million people, and each of the 15 City Councilmembers comes from a district of almost 250,000 (U.S. Census Bureau, 2000). Hence, candidates for municipal office must reach out to a very large number of voters—nearly two million with citywide candidates—and do so in one of the costliest media markets in the country. It is not surprising, therefore, that Los Angeles elections are expensive. From 1993 to 2007, the average successful Council bid cost a candidate \$347,000.

Since the Los Angeles City matching funds took effect, the average sum that successful Latino Council candidates have raised through traditional means has not changed substantially (Figure 19). The lowest average by far came in 1993, when six Latino candidates vied for four Council seats. However, one losing Latina raised \$412,260. In 2005, successful Latino Council candidates—only one of whom participated in the matching program—raised an average of \$450,000.

**Figure 19**  
**Successful Latino Candidates for Los Angeles City Council**



See Sources and Methodology for more information.

Average spending by successful Latino Council candidates has closely tracked the average raised, and both sums have dwarfed the average matching funds given to successful participants. For example, in 2005 Councilmember José Huizar received the maximum \$100,000 in his bid for the open seat in District 14, but raised over \$560,000 in private contributions. The average successful Latino candidate spent close to \$360,000 in 2007. In comparison, successful Latino candidate expenditures in New York City averaged around \$140,000 in 2005 (Figure 31), and successful “traditional” Latinos in Arizona averaged \$12,779 in 2006 (Figure 8).

With the variation in program participation over the years, there are only two election cycles—2003 and 2005—in which at least one Latino participating candidate and one running “traditionally” won election. Given the many variables that can affect campaign competitiveness, and thus the fundraising burden on candidates, only these two election cycles can be used to compare the amounts raised and spent by successful Latino participants and non-participants. Figure 20 shows the average differences. In 2007 these sums were almost identical. However, in 2005, successful Latino participants actually outraised their “traditional” counterparts, and with the additional matching funds, substantially outspent them.

**Figure 20**  
**Successful Latino Candidates for Los Angeles City Council**

		2005	2007
Raised	Participating	\$567,178.00	\$311,255.98
	Non-Participating	\$335,235.33	\$318,778.75
Spent	Participating	\$678,183.00	\$357,894.28
	Non-Participating	\$275,764.33	\$360,171.02

See Sources and Methodology for more information.

Although relatively few Latino candidates have run for mayor since the start of the program, the role of money and the matching program in those races is important. Figure 21 shows the average total raised, matched, and spent by major mayoral candidates, those who raised at least \$150,000 (the qualifying threshold for participation). Overall, the amount spent by successful candidates has varied fairly moderately since the program started. The winner in 1993 and 1997—Richard Riordan—did not take part in the program either time and therefore did not have to limit spending. In 2001 all major candidates participated, yet the overall cost differed little from that in the previous election. However, 1993 and 2001 give better grounds for comparison, since both were open races. Candidates spent over \$1.2 million more in 1993 (not accounting for inflation), when the winner did not participate in the program, than in 2001, when the winner did.

**Figure 21**  
**Candidates for Mayor of Los Angeles**

		1993	1997	2001	2005
Average Raised	Latino Candidates	\$412,260	n/a	\$2,132,193	\$2,343,595
	Non-Latino Candidates	\$1,941,364	\$1,897,083	\$2,664,574	\$1,954,227
	Winner	\$4,750,815	\$3,380,082	\$2,888,702	\$3,227,346
Average Matched	Latino Candidates	\$272,586	n/a	\$643,070	\$616,965
	Non-Latino Candidates	\$382,499	\$159,593	\$650,702	\$667,511
	Winner	n/a	n/a	\$733,500	\$833,500
Average Spent	Latino Candidates	\$672,864	n/a	\$3,032,285	\$2,981,328
	Non-Latino Candidates	\$2,300,581	\$1,989,266	\$3,241,709	\$2,555,533
	Winner	\$4,863,036	\$3,430,947	\$3,647,717	\$4,078,079

*See Sources and Methodology for more information.*

In the 1993 elections, only one major Latina candidate ran for mayor, but other contenders heavily outraised and outspent her, including the personally wealthy Richard Riordan. No Latinos ran against Riordan in 1997, but in the 2001 current Mayor Antonio Villaraigosa made his first bid for the city’s executive position, as did Congressman Xavier Becerra. Villaraigosa narrowly lost to Jim Hahn, but defeated Hahn in 2005 to become the first Latino mayor of Los Angeles in over a century. Villaraigosa outraised Hahn in both elections, and all major candidates participated in the city’s matching program.

Little evidence suggests that the city’s matching program contributed to the election of Mayor Villaraigosa. As former Speaker of the California State Assembly, he brought with him tremendous political and campaign experience. He also faced a participating opponent, whom he had only narrowly lost to in the previous mayoral election.

As in all jurisdictions, independent expenditures in Los Angeles municipal campaigns can have a major impact. In the last three election cycles, spending by independent expenditure committees reached staggering proportions. For City Council races, they totaled \$466,343 in 2001 and \$1.4 million in 2003, and for the 2005 citywide races they exceeded \$3.6 million (Levin, 2006). Almost \$1.7 million of known independent expenditures went to back challenger Villaraigosa, and he spent a substantial percentage of this sum on this campaign. Over \$2.4 million in independent expenditures supported the incumbent Hahn.

Independent expenditure reporting requirements in Los Angeles are relatively stringent, compared to many jurisdictions. They include information on whom the expense goes for or against, when applicable. More significantly, if independent expenditures pass a certain threshold in a race, the spending limits for all candidates in that race are lifted, and participating candidates can receive additional matching funds in the general election.

Even so, measuring the impact of independent expenditures on Latino candidates is extremely challenging. Thus far in the matching program's history, no perfect storm has occurred where independent expenditures thwarted a new, viable Latino candidate's bid for office due to lack of matching funds or inability to raise enough private contributions, but in theory, the potential exists.

## THE INSIDE STORY

Interviewees personally familiar with public financing in Los Angeles expressed a variety of opinions on its functionality and efficacy. However, they have been uniform in their opinion of independent expenditures. All acknowledged that these have dramatically changed the face of municipal elections in Los Angeles, and continue to rise dramatically. As Los Angeles City Councilmember Tony Cardenas said, "They have, and can, dwarf the actual campaign expenditures."

Stephen Kaufman, a fundraising lawyer with almost a decade of experience working with Los Angeles municipal candidates suggested that the political musical chairs bred by term limits has played a key role:

"With term limits coming into play, and folks shifting from Sacramento and coming down here, and going from here up to Sacramento, it's really caused the money flow to impact local jurisdictions much more than in the past. It's put a higher price tag on a seat in local jurisdictions, either because you have a termed-out legislator who now has to go home and find a place to be, like a City Council seat in Los Angeles, for example, or just provides more incentive for people to run for City Council in their local jurisdictions knowing full well that seats in the state Assembly are going to open in four years, or six years. So it puts a premium on the steppingstone of the City Council. So you're seeing more and more money flowing into these local races as a result of that, which has led to more independent spending."

Interviewees expressed two major concerns about independent expenditures. One involved the lack of full disclosure, which can hamper the matching fund's attempts to mitigate their impact on participating candidates. Councilmember Cardenas noted:

"You can make a candidate disclose until they're blue in the face, and then all of a sudden you get this massive independent expenditure. And their disclosure requirements are different, and more lax. They should very carefully increase disclosure requirements for independent expenditures, which isn't hindering freedom of speech, but is providing awareness about who is spending money."

They also felt that donors did not always report quickly enough. Stephen Kaufman pointed out that "folks spending money independently are supposed to notify the ethics commission within 24 hours of either making the expenditure or incurring the expense. There's supposed to be instantaneous reporting, but it hasn't always happened that way."

The second concern with independent expenditures relates to the broad criteria for lifting the spending limit. Stephen Kaufman, who has seen firsthand the impact such a mid-campaign change can have, noted the frequency with which the limits are lifted:

“The law isn’t written so that if an independent expenditure is made against you, your limit gets lifted. They look at spending in the entire race. So whether an expenditure is made against you, for you, or against another opponent, there’s kind of an overall threshold, and when that threshold gets met—\$50,000 in the case of a City Council race—that limit gets lifted for everybody. The limits get lifted almost every time in a contested race.”

However, interviewees did not suggest that either of these issues—or anything else related to the rise of independent expenditures—has necessarily hurt minority or Latino candidates’ ability to run or win election. Stephen Kaufman went on to add:

“It [independent expenditure] doesn’t hurt anyone participating in the program. Once the limits are lifted, a candidate who may have benefitted from a matching fund program will also get the additional added benefit of being able to raise and spend more money in excess of the spending limits.”

Councilmember Cardenas identified a far greater concern than independent expenditures: the potential for self-financed candidates to greatly outspend Latinos: “There will never ever ever ever ever ever ever be a level playing field unless you have an amendment to the Constitution of the United States that does not allow freedom of speech of an individual to spend as much of their own dollars on their own campaign.” There is a cap on the amount participating candidates can receive: \$800,000 for mayoral candidates and \$125,000 for City Councilmembers in the general election. Thus, theoretically, very wealthy candidates can overwhelm participating candidates in terms of funding and spending.

Interviewees felt the program only partially “leveled the playing field” for non-traditional candidates or those lacking the resources typically needed for a successful campaign. Fundraising expert Stephen Kaufman noted:

“I think it’s a mistake to try and characterize the program as something that people can walk off the street and do, because that’s just not how you run for office particularly in a city like Los Angeles. Having said that, it does provide an added benefit for folks who are running for office who may not have the financial means other folks do. It does provide the ability to get some well needed cash in their pockets in the hopes of leveling the playing field.”

With the price-tag of a successful campaign in Los Angeles in the hundreds of thousands of dollars, he felt that the matching program could only do so much:

“To win a seat in L.A. or anywhere, you’ve got to get your name out there. It’s not a small jurisdiction where you can literally go to door to door and meet every person. You’ve got to be able to reach out and communicate with people. Fundamentally, it’s about getting enough money to do that, or getting enough organizations to do that in the absence of money.”

Los Angeles has entertained the idea of full public financing for city elections several times, most recently in 2005 with the introduction of a proposal backed by three City Councilmembers,

including Eric Garcetti, a Latino. Although the proposal did not garner much Council support, it is now in committee awaiting feedback from the citizen-based Neighborhood Councils. Some of the interviewees expressed skepticism that full public financing would mitigate the concerns about the current matching program. Cecilia Cabello, who serves as Legislative Deputy to Councilmember Eric Garcetti and is working closely on the proposal, explained that one issue raised by other Councilmembers involved independent expenditures:

“Some proposals kind of matched IEs, to a certain extent, but if you have a candidate who is well funded, or has ads coming out on their behalf, and they keep slamming you, the publicly funded candidate, you can only respond up to a certain amount. You may be able to get money to fund responses against one, two, or three IEs, but if they have money for 10, what do you do?”

Stephen Kaufman echoed this concern:

“Until the proliferation of independent spending in the last few cycles, it [the matching program] seemed to be working, and as I said, these days, they [independent expenditures] tend to occasionally make a mockery of the process. But you’re going to have the same problem with independent spending if you have full public financing program as well. In a town where, frankly, there’s a lot of money and traditional involvement of the Hollywood community and businesses, a full public financing system may even lead to more independent spending, and I don’t think that’s necessarily the route we want to go.”

According to Cecilia Cabello, when discussing the full financing proposals before the City Council, certain Councilmembers noted that theoretically—since limited amounts of public money are available for public financing and it must be voluntary—an extremely wealthy candidate not participating in the program could easily outperform a fully public financed candidate. However, there was some agreement among the interviewees about the impact of full public financing on the diversity of the candidate pool, as Councilmember Cardenas noted:

“I think [full public financing] would encourage more people to run, but I don’t think it’s going to create the level playing field that people say it will. There are other dynamics beyond public financing that affect who wins and who loses in a race.”

Councilmember Cardenas expressed some concern that full public financing might actually steepen the playing field for minority or Latino candidates:

“I think that if we change the system too much from what it is right now, we’re going to have unintended consequences, and I do believe we will have a reduction, at least in California, in the number of people of color representing [the public] at every level of government where they change it too much. I’m not saying the system we have is perfect, or we shouldn’t try to make improvements, but public financing in and of itself is not the answer.”

His concerns primarily focused on how one qualifies for and participates in public financing:

“In some ways, some of the shortcomings of public financing do in fact hurt certain candidates more than others. Take into account people’s faith, ethnicity, and gender, and look at contributions. What you’re going to find is that Latinos are rarely contributors to the political process when it comes to checks.”

Overall, complaints about the current matching program were relatively minor. In terms of the additional reporting requirements participation in the program demands, Stephen Kaufman noted that the only problem is that the reporting requirements can be extremely time consuming:

“We’re literally making copies of checks and having to submit them with the back up, and in the mayor’s race you’re talking about millions of dollars in matching funds, at \$500 a contribution or less, you’re talking about a lot of checks that have to be compiled. It’s a very laborious process.”



NEW YORK CITY:  
A SIX-TO-ONE MATCHING PROGRAM




# NEW YORK CITY: A SIX-TO-ONE MATCHING PROGRAM

## THE CITY AND ITS GOVERNMENT

Once the world’s largest city and long the nation’s, New York today is home to over 8.2 million people—more than twice as many as the City of Los Angeles. It is not only the most diverse city in the country but it also has the largest Latino population. Over 2.3 million Latinos live in the city’s five boroughs, and they comprise more than one out of every four residents (Appendix 3).


Latino representation in New York’s municipal elected offices only started to increase in the last 20 years. In 1984, the City Council had 35 districts and just two Latinos served on it. New York increased its number of districts to 51 in 1991 and nine Latinos, or 18 percent, won election. Today, Latinos still represent nine districts (Figure 22). Since 1988 a Latino has represented the Bronx as borough president, but no Latino has ever served in any of the citywide offices, which include mayor, public advocate (known as president of the City Council until 1993), and comptroller.

**Figure 22**  
**Latinos Serving in Elected Municipal Office**




*See Sources and Methodology for more information.*

**Figure 23**  
**Latinos Running for City Council, Primary Election**



**Figure 24**  
**Latinos Running for Citywide Offices and Borough President, Primary Election**



*Note: There were no municipal elections in 1987 or 1995. No Latino ran for City Council in 1999 or 2007. See Sources and Methodology for more information.*

Although the number of Latinos elected officials has been on a plateau the past 16 years, the number of Latino candidates has increased dramatically since 2001. In the 1980s only a handful of Latinos—usually less than 10—ran for office, and this number roughly doubled after the imposition of the City’s public campaign finance program. A dramatic upward shift occurred in 2001, after 49 of the 51 Councilmembers left office as a result of term limits (Figure 23). However, there has been little change in the number of viable Latino candidates for citywide and borough president offices (Figure 24).

In 1988, the New York City Council passed the Campaign Finance Act, which imposed sweeping reforms on the City’s campaign financing process, including establishment of a matching funds


program. A voter referendum the same year approved incorporation of the Campaign Finance Board into the City’s Charter to oversee the program and matters relating to campaign finance in the city, and by the 1989 Citywide elections, the program was in effect (New York City Campaign Finance Board, 2007).

While many changes have occurred in the program since its start, its basic workings are the same as in 1989. Candidates can qualify for the program if they face competition in an election, meet a threshold amount in contributions, and agree to set spending limits. Once enrolled, they can receive matching funds from the city for the eligible contributions they receive, with additional benefits if they face high-spending opponents. The program is available for candidates for mayor, comptroller, public advocate, borough president, and City Councilmember, though not judge (Appendices 1 and 2).

### LATINO PARTICIPANTS IN THE MATCHING FUNDS PROGRAM

Participation has been consistently high among Latino candidates, except in 1989—the inaugural year—when only six Latino candidates total ran for office (Figure 25). However, it is of note that participation was slightly less common for candidates overall in its early years (Levin, 2006).


**Figure 25**  
**Share of City Council Candidates Participating in Matching Fund Program, Primary and General Elections**



*\*Special Elections*  
 See Sources and Methodology for more information.

Unlike Latino incumbent candidates in Los Angeles, those in New York have shown no dramatic drop in participation. Among all Latino candidates, 60 percent or more have participated since 1997 (Figure 26). (In 1989 and 1993, no non-incumbent Latino candidates were elected.


**Figure 26**  
**Share of Successful Latino Candidates for City Council Participating in Program**



*Note: There were no municipal elections in 1987 or 1995. No Latino ran for City Council in 1999 or 2007.  
 See Sources and Methodology for more information.*

Figure 27 shows the non-incumbent Latino participants as a percentage of all Latino participants. Non-incumbents have made up more than half of all participants in every election year since inception, with a low of 57 percent in 1989 and high of 91 percent in 2001, when term limits forced almost all sitting Councilmembers from office. Otherwise, the figure reveals similar levels of participation over time.

**Figure 27**  
**Non-Incumbent Share of Latino Candidates for City Council Participating in Program, Primary and General Elections**




*Note: There were no municipal elections in 1987 or 1995. No Latino ran for City Council in 1999 or 2007.  
 See Sources and Methodology for more information.*

## SUCCESS RATE OF LATINO PARTICIPANTS

Except in 1989, when only one Latino candidate took part and prevailed, less than half of participating Latino candidates have won election. Figure 28 shows the successful Latino participants as a percentage of all Latino participants.

**Figure 28**  
Share of Latino Participating Candidates Elected to City Council




*Note: There were no municipal elections in 1987 or 1995. No Latino ran for City Council in 1999 or 2007.*

*See Sources and Methodology for more information.*

These numbers do not take into consideration incumbency, which could affect the success rate of participants. Figure 29 shows that successful Latino incumbents outnumbered successful Latino non-incumbents in every year but 1991 and 2001. In 1991, voters elected the same number of participating non-incumbents—three—as non-participating non-incumbents. Only in 2001 did the participating non-incumbents exceed all other categories. This fact in and of itself does not indicate that the matching program is ineffective at helping elect Latinos. For instance, an incumbent Latino elected official might theoretically face a very competitive and well-funded non-Latino opponent and survive the challenge because of matching funds. However, it may suggest that the available data is insufficient to determine that the program has met the goal of electing more qualified minority candidates.

**Figure 29**  
City Council Districts Won by Latino Candidate



*Note: There were no municipal elections in 1987 or 1995. No Latino ran for City Council in 1999 or 2007.*

*See Sources and Methodology for more information.*

So few Latino candidates have run for citywide and borough president offices that it is impossible to gauge the impact of the matching fund program. Today, there is one Latino borough president (for the Bronx), the same number as before the program. Figure 30 shows the serious Latino candidates for these offices since the program began.

**Figure 30**  
**Number of Latino Candidates for Borough and Citywide Offices,**  
**Primary and General Election**

	Borough President	Public Advocate	Comptroller	Mayor
1989	2	1	0	0
1993	1	1	1	0
1997	3	0	0	0
2001	2	1	0	1
2005	3	0	0	1

*See Sources and Methodology for more information.*

While these figures may reveal little, some milestones have occurred. In 2001 and 2005, former Bronx Borough President Fernando Ferrer mounted competitive bids for mayor. In 2001 he narrowly lost to then-Public Advocate Mark Green in the Democratic primary, and in 2005 he lost to incumbent Mayor Michael Bloomberg, who dramatically outspent him.


### MATCHING FUNDS AND THE MONEY FLOW

New York is a very expensive city for political campaigns. Those running for citywide office must reach out to millions of potential voters—more than the entire populations of some states. Council candidates must also mobilize broad-based efforts. The average Councilmember represents a district of 143,580 people—less than in Los Angeles, but still the size of a major U.S. city such as Syracuse. New York is also the costliest media market in the country, and the composite cost of living in Manhattan is more than double that of the national average (U.S. Census Bureau, 2008).

Since 1997, the price of a successful City Council race in New York City has soared. While in 1993 successful Latino candidates generally spent less than \$50,000, in the last three City Council elections the average has exceeded \$140,000. Successful Latino candidates have also raised record average amounts in recent elections, surpassing \$140,000 in 2005 (based on primary and general elections) (Figure 31). Nonetheless, this sum is less than a third of a \$450,000 that the average successful Latino Council candidate in Los Angeles raised that year (Figure 19).

Though races are far more expensive in Los Angeles, recent successful Latino candidates in both cities have received similar amounts in matching funds: roughly between \$50,000 and \$100,000 (In full-funding Arizona, by contrast, successful Latino legislative candidates received an average of about \$24,000 in the last four election cycles). Thus, matching funds are a much more important share of the campaign budget for candidates in New York than Los Angeles.

**Figure 31**  
**Successful Latino Candidates for City Council, General Election**



*Note: Since Average Matched applies only to participants, it can exceed half of the total Average Raised. No Latino participants who received matching funds were successful in 1991 and 1993. No municipal elections took place in 1987 or 1995, and no Latinos ran for City Council in 1999 or 2007.*

*See Sources and Methodology for more information.*

Although program participation has varied little over the years, there have been only three years when voters elected at least one Latino candidate who accepted matching funds and at least one who did not (1991, 1993, and 2005). Figure 32 shows the average amounts that successful Latino participants and non-participants both raised and spent in these three election cycles. There is very little difference between participants and non-participants in 2005. In 1991 and 1993 participants and non-participants raised similar amounts of cash, but in 2005 non-participants exceeded participants by about 80 percent. In 1991 and 1993, participants heavily outspent their “traditional” counterparts. This trend reversed in 2005, with successful non-participants moderately outspending successful participants.

**Figure 32**  
**Successful Latino Candidates for New York City Council**

		1991	1993	2005
Raised	Participating	\$44,580	\$49,281	\$102,991
	Non-Participating	\$44,976	\$47,232	\$183,817
Spent	Participating	\$68,229	\$58,182	\$138,466
	Non-Participating	\$40,337	\$41,390	\$148,015

*See Sources and Methodology for more information.*

Although few Latino candidates have run for mayor of New York since the start of the program (and no major Latino candidate did prior to 2001), the role of money and the matching program is important in those races. Figure 33 shows the average total raised, matched, and spent by major mayoral candidates. Since Michael Bloomberg so heavily outspent his opponents in both of his successful elections, his

figures are excluded from the non-Latino candidate averages, but do appear under “Winner.” Most striking is the 2005 election, in which former Bronx Borough President Fernando Ferrer squared off against incumbent Michael Bloomberg. The billionaire mayor declined to take matching funds and spent a record \$84,587,319 in the general election, primarily from his own personal wealth. In comparison, Ferrer spent \$9,165,301, less than one-ninth that sum. Whether the dramatic outspending led to Ferrer’s loss is debatable, but the size of the gap suggests the problem deep-pocket candidates can pose for publicly financed elections.

Also of note, in 2001, Latino former Congressman Herman Badillo faced off against Michael Bloomberg for the Republican nomination, while former Borough President Ferrer battled well-financed, competitive opponents in former Public Advocate Mark Green and Comptroller Alan Hevesi. Both Latinos lost their bids. In 2005, Ferrer was the only Latino in the race for mayor, succeeding in the primary but ultimately losing in the general election.

**Figure 33**  
**Major Candidates for Mayor of New York City, Average Raised, Matched and Spent, Primary and General Elections**

		2001	2005
Average Raised	Latino Candidates	\$3,384,285	\$6,239,291
	Non-Latino Candidates*	\$6,996,342	\$3,253,343
	Winner	\$73,149,689	\$84,155,868
Average Matched	Latino Candidates	\$1,614,328	\$3,897,336
	Non-Latino Candidates*	\$2,186,947	\$1,877,654
	Winner	n/a	n/a
Average Spent	Latino Candidates	\$4,810,441	\$10,556,247
	Non-Latino Candidates*	\$7,990,713	\$4,710,097
	Winner	\$73,109,226	\$84,587,319

*\*Does not include Michael Bloomberg*

*See Sources and Methodology for more information.*

As in all jurisdictions, independent expenditures in New York’s municipal campaigns are unlimited and can have tremendous impact. Unfortunately, it is impossible to measure their direct effect on candidates in New York due to the city’s extremely modest reporting and disclosure requirements. Moreover, its matching program contains no provisions to mitigate spending by independent political committees against a candidate, as the Arizona and Los Angeles programs do. Whether this fact has played a decisive role in an election is unclear, but the potential clearly exists.

### THE INSIDE STORY

New York City’s matching program started 20 years ago and none of today’s elected officials first ran before its enactment. However, the city’s elected leadership has enough experience—and there are enough ongoing changes to the program—to give rise to a wide array of estimations of its effectiveness. Latino elected officials interviewed for this report expressed several opinions on the program’s benefits and many on its shortcomings.

The heavy reporting requirements drew the greatest complaints. In essence, the interviewees believed the requirements result in the program giving with one hand and taking with the other. Councilmember Hiram Monserrate, the first Latino elected to public office in Queens, is now serving his second term, and he made this concern very clear:

“I think the reporting is an undue burden, an unnecessary expense on the campaign to sustain. You have to raise money just to be compliant with the Campaign Finance Board [CFB]. In my case, I don’t know how many thousands of dollars I’ve spent on compliance—probably 15 to 20 at least.”

A fundraising novice when he first ran for the New York City Council, Councilmember Monserrate noted that “the [program’s] matching dollars are good—they are very helpful—and the program helps to put your position out in the literature that they mail for free to voters.” However, he immediately added, “That’s about it.” In terms of the program’s effect on encouraging more minority and Latino candidates to run, he noted:

“The program does and doesn’t level the playing field. Theoretically it does, as it’s a matching program, and then it doesn’t, because I think poorer candidates—and quite frankly, minority candidates—for some reason have always had much more difficulty complying with the CFB rules, and would also wind up getting fined more.”

Reporting requirements to ensure compliance and public disclosure are stringent, as they are in any jurisdiction with a sophisticated campaign finance code, whether it has public financing or not. However, in New York City, participating candidates have to file with three different entities: the New York State Board of Elections, the New York City Board of Elections, and the New York City Campaign Finance Board. Councilmember Monserrate was quick to point out that this added complexity can affect minority candidates disproportionately:

“The reality is that if you are representing a lower-income neighborhood, and there’s lower levels of income and education that you are dealing with, volunteers and so forth are therefore the same. So if you’re looking for volunteers to keep files in order and so forth, to get that type of quality work you’re going to have to pay, which takes away from the other parts of the campaign. So instead of promoting the candidate, we’re spending a significant amount of the budget to comply.”

How effective is the program for new or underfunded candidates—particularly Latinos? As Councilmember Monserrate observed, “If you can’t pay someone to do your compliance, you’d be very hard pressed to be in line with the compliance process.” This bureaucratic expense makes it hard for those with limited funds to launch campaigns. Second-term Bronx Borough President Adolfo Carrión, a former City Councilmember and candidate for comptroller, expressed this sentiment pointedly: “I think for me there is a concern that you handicap the minority candidates in general (although there are lots of exceptions) because people from poorer districts, by virtue of the fact that it’s that much more difficult to raise money when you’re starting out.” Councilmember Rosie Mendez of Manhattan shared these concerns:

“If there’s something wrong, [the] Campaign Finance [Board] is just going to have you. The reporting requirements are expensive, and probably I’d even say burdensome. Some people end up having issues with the filings, months, maybe even years later.”

She based this observation on personal experience. After opening a committee account in January 2004 and winning office in November 2005, a final audit of her account came in 2007. “The final audit was, to my mind, unjustifiable,” she said. “It would take a year if everything was done properly and any money was owed. In our case, they determined we had to pay \$200.”

Moreover, the City Council passed further restrictions and conditions in 2007, which she says will “have the effect of almost making it mandatory that any but the most marginal campaigns have paid professional staff to manage [them].” Overall, she says, “the amount of recordkeeping has just gone through the roof.”

While Borough President Carrión feels the program “opened the door to different people, to new players” but is fraught with other problems, Councilmember Mendez still believes it “absolutely helps level the playing field.” She credits the program with enabling her to run, and says it “allows many individuals who would not be able to run for funding reasons to actually launch a campaign and be competitive. What you see is 10 to 12 people running for each seat now, whereas before there would only be two, three people. Four was a lot of people years ago. Now you see a standard of eight people in a given race.”

The effectiveness of Mayor Michael Bloomberg’s campaign—almost entirely self-financed in both 2001 and 2005—came up several times. Although Councilmember Mendez did not directly address the impact of a wealthy candidate in pool of publicly-funded candidates that may include Latinos, Councilmember Monserrate and Borough President Carrión did. Councilmember Monserrate observed that “the reality is, you can’t compete with that kind of money,” despite the benefit of matching dollars. Referring to his own first bid for office, he noted, “Had there been a candidate in the race who had personal wealth or greater fundraising skill, that would have put us [candidates] at a disadvantage.”

The Bronx borough president believes that since campaign finance programs like New York’s place greater limitations on participants, their effect may be the opposite of the one intended—instead of increasing the diversity of the candidate pool, they may slow the emergence of candidates with slender means:

“[By placing limits on fundraising] we’re dangerously opening the door for only people who can—due to the luxury of wealth—play politics. One, because they can opt out of public financing, because they don’t have to worry about being competitive financially. And two, they can take the time. It is essentially a part-time gig for them.”

Despite the benefits of public financing, he says, “Wealthy candidates like Bloomberg have redefined the conversation. I think that wealth trumps just about everything in the United States, and I think it plays an important role in politics.”

Interviewees also expressed concerns about the impact of socio-economic variables on a candidate’s viability—a problem public financing is supposed to mitigate. Councilmember Monserrate suggests that it is unclear “how much [the] Campaign Finance [Board] really takes into account poorer neighborhoods and what we’re dealing with.” In addition to difficulties finding skilled volunteers to manage the advanced bookkeeping requirements, candidates must raise campaign funds from their constituencies under partial-public financing programs like New York City’s. Bronx Borough President Carrión points out,

“What ends up happening, I think, is that a lot of the candidates go to the people who have personal wealth, or have the ability to write relatively large personal checks. For example, if you’re running for citywide office here, you can get people to give you \$4,950. How many people—average people in a local district—can afford to write you a check for \$4,950? Not that many people. If people who come from areas of wealth are able to get contributions much larger than people who don’t come from an area of wealth, it creates a whole lopsided playing field.”

However, Councilmember Mendez sees the issue slightly differently:

“For individuals in my district, who don’t have a lot of money, sometimes they struggle to give me \$5, \$10. So to them, while it may be difficult to take \$10 out of their budget to contribute to a campaign, they think of it as being ‘Wow, my \$10 will become \$50,’ and they feel proud of the fact they are able to make a financial contribution to my campaign.”

Does the matching program really open the door for Latino candidates? “It really depends on the district,” she says. “You have some districts where the demographics are such that Latinos are the dominant ethnic group, and you’ll see more individuals running.” However, she adds, “Obviously the other feature is the term limits issue. It allows for the demographic changes of a neighborhood that much quicker.”

Overall, opinions on the program varied widely. There was consensus that it may have helped open the door for more Latino candidates, yet interviewees differed about the extent it has helped, and more as to whether it has helped those Latino candidates get elected to office. However, all believed the system needs subtle changes. Councilmember Mendez suggests that the Campaign Finance Board could use additional staffing to make the process quicker, easier, and less burdensome to candidates. Councilmember Monserrate feels the system should not be at odds with itself:

“This is supposed to be a process—should be a process—where candidates get the benefit, and there’s a level field for those who want to run for office who are not career politicians, who are grassroots candidates. It shouldn’t be that they are entering an archaic system that’s like a maze, and if you take a wrong turn the CFB hits you with egregious fines. That’s not what it should be about. The system is supposed to about facilitating people who want to run for office, not [about being] a disciplinarian per se. I understand they have to have some rules, and they have to make sure people are complying and doing what they say they are doing with their money, but there has to be a better system. The system right now is not working effectively.”

Bronx Borough President Carrión sees the program as “a good thing in principle, given what the apparent goals of that reform were,” but he believes that the program has had unanticipated effects as it has grown and changed, and some of them contradict its intended goals. He advocated cautious attempts of reform in the future: “We move slowly towards reform, but the reforms are more significant. That’s very frustrating for people on the margins, obviously. That’s why the marginalized are constantly railing against entrenched interests. But do you correct it by going to the other extreme? I’m not sure.”



CONCLUSION  
AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH



## CONCLUSION

### AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

When New York City enacted its Campaign Finance Act in 1988 and established its public finance program—the first of the three jurisdictions in this report to do so—one of its prime objectives was to encourage more candidates overall to run for office. And though in all three jurisdictions the number of Latino candidates has indeed increased since public funding commenced, the role of the programs in this growth is unclear.

In all three jurisdictions first-year participation was modest. In Arizona and New York, participation rose dramatically in the second election cycle in which the program was in effect, and in Los Angeles in the fourth. Reasons for the initial hesitation are unclear, although it is likely that candidates needed time to familiarize themselves with the process and possibilities.

Of all three programs, New York City's highlights the potential hazard of burdensome reporting requirements. Though candidates unquestionably must account for their finances, in New York many complained that red tape significantly undermined the effect of matching funds by necessitating the hiring of professional staff to handle the accounting work. In Los Angeles—and to a lesser extent, Arizona—interviewees also mentioned this issue, though not as pointedly. For participating candidates lacking personal resources or fundraising networks, the burden of unimportant reporting requirements may lessen the program's effectiveness.

How much does public financing improve the number of viable Latino candidates running for elected office? The answer so far is tentative. It seemed to help most clearly in Arizona, where the program covers almost all campaign costs with a lump sum and matching funds. Arizona interviewees all agreed that full public financing had likely encouraged many minority and Latino candidates to run. The verdict was mixed in Los Angeles and New York, though, and only a few interviewees felt their matching funds program increased the number of Latino candidates.

However, even in Arizona, confounding variables muddy the assessment. For instance, the largest jump in number of Latino candidates for the Arizona House came in 2000—the first year of the clean elections program—when 20 ran, compared to 12 in 1998. Yet only six of those 20 actually took part in the program, and it is scarcely likely that public funding spurred the remaining 14 Latino non-participants into the race. The catalyst may have been term limits. The state's term limits law had its first impact in 2000, preventing 22 candidates from running in that year and 16 in 2002. Since 2000, the number of Latino candidates has remained in the low 20s.

Similarly, New York City also saw a dramatic upsurge in Latino candidates for municipal office, though in the second election in which the program was available. Eighteen Latinos ran for City Council in 1991, compared to seven in 1989—a 164 percent increase. However, this time the key motivator was the availability of seats. In 1991 the City Council augmented its number of districts from 35 to 51. The appearance of new political units and the 46 percent increase in open seats on a then

term-limit-free City Council almost certainly encouraged many more Latinos to run. Another jump occurred in 2001, with the first impact of term limits. Overall, while public financing may have played a significant role in some Latinos' decisions to run, it is difficult to determine how many it affected and to what extent. In citywide races, there have been no gains in the number of strong Latino candidates since the program started, with the exception of Fernando Ferrer's unsuccessful mayoral bids in 2001 and 2005.

In Los Angeles, the number of Latino candidates has also risen, but this increase does not correlate with the availability of public financing. The number of Latino candidates for City Council did not jump dramatically until 1999, the fourth election cycle in which matching funds were available. Here, the key factor was probably term limits, which voters passed in 1995. Indeed, not only did the number of Latino candidates rise from seven to 13, but all were non-incumbents. At the same time, all also took part in the program.

Has public financing increased the number of Latinos elected to office? More Latinos do serve today in all three jurisdictions. However, their success does not directly correlate with public funding, as the same variables that may have influenced the number of Latinos running for office may also have affected their likelihood of election. In New York City, the creation of 16 new districts in 1991 was almost certainly the main factor in boosting the number of Latinos elected—especially since that number has remained stable since. In Los Angeles and Arizona, term limits and decennial redistricting appear to have played considerable roles.

All interviewees echoed these concerns, and expressed uncertainty or skepticism about whether public financing had increased the number of Latinos elected. Almost all also suggested that, even if public financing had helped elect some candidates, term limits and redistricting were also likely to have contributed to their success. Non-Latino incumbents may long have represented districts with growing Latino populations, and as such, term limits seem to increase the number of Latino candidates most when incumbents are forced from office. After newly elected Latinos join a city council or legislature, they become incumbents themselves in the next election cycle and their presence can depress the number of Latino candidates. Similarly, through redistricting, districts can be drawn to maximize Latino voter “strength” (such as for Voting Rights Act compliance) and thus encourage more Latinos to run for office and increase their likelihood of election. Few examples exist in the three jurisdictions covered in this report of a Latino candidate winning a seat not traditionally held by a Latino, and the disparity in share of population versus elected leadership is clear.

Interviewees universally noted the advantage wealthy candidates enjoy (as have public finance advocates). Candidates expressed this concern most clearly in New York City, but also in Los Angeles, as a result of both cities' experiences with extremely wealthy mayors: Michael Bloomberg and Richard Riordan. Although all three programs have provisions that take effect when a wealthy candidate pours cash into her campaign, these provisions only go so far, and even the best fundraiser can hardly compete with a war chest in the tens of millions. Such cases are rare, but they nonetheless belie any assertion that public financing always “levels the playing field.”

The Arizona interviewees all expressed positive feelings about the program and its benefits. The state's clean-elections approach was the only full public financing program in this study, and simply requires candidates to raise a certain number of \$5 contributions to receive a lump sum from the state. Since Los Angeles and New York use partial public financing, all candidates in these cities must also conduct “traditional” fundraising, soliciting large private contributions. One question is whether the relatively warm feelings toward “clean elections” in Arizona will last as the program ages, and whether it will make a difference in the number of Latinos elected prior to the next redistricting.

Many other questions remain unanswered. Even in jurisdictions like New York City, where the program is approaching its 20th anniversary, the many changes to district boundaries, term limits, the program itself, and other variables are intertwined and not mutually exclusive or discrete. Only more election cycles will yield the additional data to make the analysis clearer (or even possible with a young program such as Arizona's). Among the questions are:

- How have jurisdictions with public financing fared compared to those without? An apparent lack of change in the number of Latino elected officials may suggest success if the ever-growing need for campaign funds has caused negative change elsewhere.
- How vital is the role of fundraising in a Latino candidate's decision to run?
- Is full public financing more effective than partial funding?
- How exactly has incumbency interacted with public financing?
- Is it possible to separate the effects of term limits and redistricting from public financing? Further research should better isolate such variables, and determine where public financing has enabled the election of Latino candidates in non-Latino districts.
- Do Latinos and non-Latino candidates overall differ in familiarity with public finance programs?
- What roles have voter registration, voter engagement, and naturalization promotion efforts played?
- Will independent expenditures help or hinder Latinos, and the equity of elections generally? If they hinder, how can they legally be controlled?

Untangling the impact of public financing from the plethora of variables is no easy task, and plainly many additional issues lie outside this skein. Scholarly research to answer these questions is currently scarce, but much needed to determine as precisely as possible how such programs affect the emergence and election rates of Latino candidates.



# APPENDICES



## Appendix 1

### Qualifications, Contribution, and Expenditure Limits for Participating Candidates<sup>1</sup>

Jurisdiction	Year Enacted	First in Effect	Offices Covered	Program Qualifications	Qualification Contribution Limits	Individual Contribution Limits <sup>2</sup>	Personal Contribution Limits	Other Contribution Limits <sup>3</sup>	Primary Election Spending Limits	General Election Spending Limits
Arizona	1998	2000	Governor	4,410	\$5	\$130 / \$5	\$1,230	\$49,180	\$638,222	\$957,333
			Secretary of State	2,755	\$5	\$130 / \$5	\$1,230	\$25,840	\$165,378	\$248,067
			Attorney General	2,755	\$5	\$130 / \$5	\$1,230	\$25,840	\$165,378	\$248,067
			Supt. of Public Instruction	1,650	\$5	\$130 / \$5	\$1,230	\$12,920	\$82,680	\$124,020
			Treasurer	1,650	\$5	\$130 / \$5	\$1,230	\$12,920	\$82,680	\$124,020
			Corporate Commissioner	1,650	\$5	\$130 / \$5	\$1,230	\$12,920	\$82,680	\$124,020
			Mine Inspector	550	\$5	\$130 / \$5	\$1,230	\$6,460	\$41,349	\$62,024
			State Legislature	220	\$5	\$130 / \$5	\$610	\$3,230	\$12,921	\$19,382
Los Angeles	1990	1991	Mayor	\$150,000	\$500	\$1,000	\$100,000	\$900,000	\$2,251,000	\$1,800,000
			City Attorney	\$75,000	\$500	\$1,000	\$100,000	\$400,000	\$1,013,000	\$788,000
			City Controller	\$75,000	\$500	\$1,000	\$100,000	\$400,000	\$900,000	\$676,000
			City Council	\$25,000	\$250	\$500	\$25,000	\$150,000	\$330,000	\$275,000
New York	1988	1989	Mayor	\$250,000	\$175	\$4,950	\$14,850	\$400	\$6,158,000	\$6,158,000
			Public Advocate	\$125,000	\$175	\$4,950	\$14,850	\$400	\$3,850,000	\$3,850,000
			City Comptroller	\$125,000	\$175	\$4,950	\$14,850	\$400	\$3,850,000	\$3,850,000
			Borough Presidents	Varies <sup>4</sup>	\$175	\$3,850	\$11,550	\$320	\$1,386,000	\$1,386,000
			City Council	\$5,000	\$175	\$2,750	\$8,250	\$250	\$161,000	\$161,000

<sup>1</sup> All figures are the most current available for each jurisdiction's public financing program, unless otherwise noted.

<sup>2</sup> In Arizona, early contributions from individuals (in the exploratory or qualifying phases of a campaign) are limited to \$130 for participating candidates. However, the contributions for the campaign period are limited to individual contributions of \$5 for participating candidates. These contribution limits do not apply to non-participating candidates

<sup>3</sup> These are additional contribution limitations for program participants unique to each jurisdiction. For Arizona, this applies to aggregate individual "early" contributions. In Los Angeles, this applies to aggregated contributions from political action committees (PACS). In New York City, this applies to contributions from entities "doing business" with the city.

<sup>4</sup> Qualification threshold is based upon the population of each borough, according to the most recent decennial census. This is currently equal to \$26,653 for the Bronx, \$49,307 for Brooklyn, \$30,744 for Manhattan, \$44,588 for Queens, and \$10,000 for Staten Island.

**Sources:**

Arizona Secretary of State

Citizens Clean Elections Commission (Arizona)

Los Angeles City Ethics Commission

New York City Campaign Finance Board

**Appendix 2**  
**Public Funding Schedules for Elections, Independent Expenditures,**  
**and Well-Financed Candidates**

**Arizona**

<p>Primary Election Allocation</p>	<p>For qualified party primary participants, a lump sum equal to the primary spending limit at the beginning of the primary election period (January of even-numbered years):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• \$12,921 for state legislative candidates</li> <li>• \$19,382 for state legislative candidates taking Reallocation Option<sup>1</sup></li> <li>• \$41,349 for state mine inspector candidates</li> <li>• \$82,680 for corporate commissioner candidates</li> <li>• \$82,680 for treasurer candidates</li> <li>• \$82,680 for superintendent of public instruction candidates</li> <li>• \$165,378 for attorney general candidates</li> <li>• \$165,378 for secretary of state candidates</li> <li>• \$638,222 for gubernatorial candidates</li> </ul> <p>For independent candidates, 70% of the sum of the primary and general spending limits.  For candidates unopposed in their party's primary election, their \$5 qualifying contributions.</p> <p>If a non-participating candidates' expenses exceed the program's primary election spending limit for that office, participating candidates are matched \$1 to \$1 for the additional spending, minus:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The participating candidates' early contribution total</li> <li>• 6% of total (an estimate of non-traditional candidates' fundraising fees)</li> </ul>
<p>"Reallocation Option"</p>	<p>State Legislative candidates belonging to the dominant party in a district (10% or greater advantage in partisan registration) have the option of reallocating a portion of their general election funds for their primary election:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• \$19,382 for the primary election</li> <li>• \$12,291 for the general election</li> </ul>
<p>Maximum Primary Election Allocation</p>	<p>Matching funds cannot exceed double the primary election spending limit:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• \$25,842 for state legislative candidates</li> <li>• \$38,764 for state legislative candidates taking Reallocation Option<sup>1</sup></li> <li>• \$82,698 for state mine inspector candidates</li> <li>• \$165,360 for corporate commissioner candidates</li> <li>• \$165,360 for treasurer candidates</li> <li>• \$165,360 for superintendent of public instruction candidates</li> <li>• \$330,756 for attorney general candidates</li> <li>• \$330,756 for secretary of state candidates</li> <li>• \$1,276,444 for gubernatorial candidates</li> </ul>

<p>General Election Allocation</p>	<p>For successful primary election participants, a lump sum equal to the general election spending limit, granted the day after the primary election:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• \$19,382 for state legislative candidates</li> <li>• \$12,291 for state legislative candidates taking Reallocation Option<sup>1</sup></li> <li>• \$62,024 for state mine inspector candidates</li> <li>• \$124,020 for corporate commissioner candidates</li> <li>• \$124,020 for treasurer candidates</li> <li>• \$124,020 for superintendent of public instruction candidates</li> <li>• \$248,067 for attorney general candidates</li> <li>• \$248,067 for secretary of state candidates</li> <li>• \$957,333 for gubernatorial candidates</li> </ul> <p>For candidates unopposed in the general election, their \$5 qualifying contributions.</p> <p>If a non-participating candidate's contributions exceed the program's general election spending limit for that office, participating candidates are matched \$1 to \$1 for the additional spending, minus:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The non-participating candidate's expenses from the primary election</li> <li>• 6% of total (an estimate of non-traditional candidates' fundraising fees)</li> </ul>
<p>Maximum General Election Allocation</p>	<p>Matching funds cannot exceed double the general election spending limit:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• \$38,764 for state legislative candidates</li> <li>• \$25,842 for state legislative candidates taking Reallocation Option<sup>1</sup></li> <li>• \$124,048 for state mine inspector candidates</li> <li>• \$248,040 for corporate commissioner candidates</li> <li>• \$248,040 for treasurer candidates</li> <li>• \$248,040 for superintendent of public instruction candidates</li> <li>• \$496,134 for attorney general candidates</li> <li>• \$496,134 for secretary of state candidates</li> <li>• \$1,914,666 for gubernatorial candidates</li> </ul>
<p>Independent Expenditures</p>	<p>Independent expenditures are matched \$1 to \$1, but are treated the same way as non-participating candidate expenses or contributions, and are included to the maximum allowable matching funds for each election.</p>
<p>Well-Financed Candidates (e.g., self-financed)</p>	<p>Matching, as with all high spending candidates or independent expenditures.</p>

<sup>1</sup> State Legislative candidates belonging to the dominant party in a district (10% or greater advantage in partisan registration) have the option of substituting their general election funds for their primary election funds to increase their competitiveness in the party primary election, known as the Reallocation Option.

Sources: Arizona Secretary of State, Citizens Clean Elections Commission (Arizona)

## Los Angeles

Primary Election Allocation	<p>\$1 to \$1 matching on qualifying individual contributions, in amounts up to</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• \$250 for City Council candidates</li> <li>• \$500 for mayoral and citywide candidates</li> </ul>
Maximum Primary Election Allocation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• \$100,000 for City Council candidates</li> <li>• \$267,000 for city controller candidates</li> <li>• \$300,000 for city attorney candidates</li> <li>• \$667,000 for mayoral candidates</li> </ul>
General Election Allocation	<p>\$1 to \$1 matching of qualifying individual contributions (see Primary Election Allocation), in addition to a lump sum of:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• \$25,000 for City Council candidates</li> <li>• \$60,000 for city controller candidates</li> <li>• \$70,000 for city attorney candidates</li> <li>• \$160,000 for mayoral candidates</li> </ul>
Maximum General Election Allocation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• \$125,000 for City Council candidates</li> <li>• \$300,000 for city controller candidates</li> <li>• \$350,000 for city attorney candidates</li> <li>• \$800,000 for mayoral candidates</li> </ul> <p>To match non-participating candidate personal contributions, or to match non-candidate spending (independent expenditures), an additional amount is available:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• \$150,000 for City Council candidates</li> <li>• \$360,000 for city controller candidates</li> <li>• \$420,000 for city attorney candidates</li> <li>• \$1,000,000 for mayoral candidates</li> </ul>
Independent Expenditures	<p>Applicable spending ceiling is lifted for all candidates running for a given office if an independent expenditure committee or committees in support of or in opposition to a candidate, spend more than:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• \$50,000 in the case of a City Council race</li> <li>• \$100,000 in the case of an election for city attorney or controller</li> <li>• \$200,000 in the case of an election for mayor</li> </ul> <p>Additional matching funds are available (see maximum general election allocation)</p>
Well-Financed Candidates (e.g., self-financed)	<p>If a candidate who declines to accept matching funds makes qualified campaign expenditures in excess of the expenditure ceiling, the applicable expenditure ceiling shall no longer be binding on any candidate running for the same office.</p> <p>Additional matching funds are available (see maximum general election allocation)</p>

Source: Los Angeles City Ethics Commission

## New York

Primary Election Allocation	For every \$1 in qualifying contributions (up to \$175) from a New York City resident, the program matches \$6, for a total of \$1,050 per contributor.
Maximum Primary Election Allocation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• \$88,550 for City Council candidates</li> <li>• \$762,300 for borough president candidates</li> <li>• \$2,117,500 for comptroller candidates</li> <li>• \$2,117,500 for public advocate candidates</li> <li>• \$3,386,900 for mayoral candidates</li> </ul> <p>If a non-participating opponent spends 50% over the spending limit for participants, the maximum available in matching funds is:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• \$107,333 for City Council candidates</li> <li>• \$924,000 for borough president candidates</li> <li>• \$2,566,667 for comptroller candidates</li> <li>• \$2,566,667 for public advocate candidates</li> <li>• \$4,105,333 for mayoral candidates</li> </ul> <p>If a non-participating opponent spends 300% over the spending limit for participants, the maximum available in matching funds is:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• \$201,250 for City Council candidates</li> <li>• \$1,732,500 for borough president candidates</li> <li>• \$4,812,500 for comptroller candidates</li> <li>• \$4,812,500 for public advocate candidates</li> <li>• \$7,697,500 for mayoral candidates</li> </ul>
General Election Allocation	Same as primary election allocations
Maximum General Election Allocation	Same allocation allowances apply for both primary and general elections.
Independent Expenditures	None
Well-Financed Candidates (e.g., self-financed)	When a non-participating candidates' expenditures exceed 50% of the spending limit for participating candidates, said spending limits are lifted.

Source: New York City Campaign Finance Board

### Appendix 3 Demographic Profiles

Jurisdiction	Total Population	Latino Population	Latino Share of Total Population	Total CVAP <sup>1</sup>	Latino CVAP <sup>1</sup>	Latino Share of CVAP <sup>1</sup>
Arizona	6,166,318	1,803,377	29%	3,973,912	677,525	17%
Los Angeles	3,773,846	1,846,535	49%	1,969,107	580,480	29%
New York	8,214,426	2,267,827	28%	4,915,136	1,075,857	22%

<sup>1</sup> CVAP, or U.S. citizen, voting age population.

### Government Profiles

Jurisdiction	Average District Population (2000)	Total Districts	Latino Percentage of the Population, by Districts			Districts Represented by a Latino	Term Limits	Year Enacted
			25-49%	50 to 74%	Greater than 75%			
Arizona	205,544	30 30 Senators 60 Representatives	6	4	0	11 6 Senators 11 Representatives	Four consecutive two-year terms in each house	1992
Los Angeles	246,321	15	5	6	1	5	Three four-year terms	1992
New York	143,580	51	6	11	1	9	Two four-year terms	1993

*Sources:*

*Los Angeles Department of City Planning, Demographic Research Unit*

*New York City Department of City Planning*

*U.S. Census Bureau, 2000 Decennial Census*

*U.S. Census Bureau, 2006 American Community Survey*

## Appendix 4 Sources and Methodology

### Elected Officials and Candidates

Counts of the Latino elected officials serving each year come from the NALEO Educational Fund National Directories of Latino Elected Officials.

Primary election ballot rosters (and for those unopposed in the primary election, general election ballot rosters) were used from each jurisdiction to determine the number of Latino and non-Latino candidates running for relevant offices each year. For Arizona, these came from the Arizona Secretary of State; for Los Angeles, the Los Angeles City Ethics Commission; and for New York City, the New York City Campaign Finance Board, and for elections prior to 1989, the New York City Board of Elections.

To help identify Latino candidates, listings were compiled in a spreadsheet (where possible), and compared to a Hispanic surname dictionary to identify potentially Latino candidates. As a second check, the ballot listings were reviewed by eye to ensure no potentially Latino candidates were overlooked. Although the surname dictionary is extensive and highly effective, and the manual check allows for finding those Latino elected officials or candidates with non-Spanish surnames, no method can guarantee inclusion of all Latinos, or prevent exclusion of some non-Latinos with Spanish names.

Unless otherwise noted, Latinos listed on election ballots were counted as candidates when their campaign contributions and expenses were greater than \$0, and where possible, met the minimum for qualification for the jurisdiction's public financing program. Latino "write-in" candidates were not included.

### Campaign Finance Data

Unless otherwise noted, all figures (raised, spent, matched) represent the average for that candidate for both the general and primary election (or in the case of Los Angeles, primary and run-off). For consistency, candidates were considered as "participating" regardless of whether they received funding or not, as long as they filed to participate, reached the qualifying threshold, and faced an opponent.

In Arizona, campaign finance data was obtained from the Arizona Secretary of State and the Arizona Citizens' Clean Elections Commission; in Los Angeles, all campaign finance data was obtained from the Los Angeles City Ethics Commission; and in New York City, all campaign finance data was obtained from the New York City Ethics Commission.

Where "n/a" is displayed, the data referenced is "not applicable" (for example, no participating Latino candidates received matching funds).

### Interviews with Latino Elected Officials and Experts

To ensure opinions expressed in the interviews were as uninfluenced and natural as possible, a discussion guide was used rather than a set list of questions to answer. This allowed the interviewees to provide uninfluenced opinions on the issues relating to public financing they felt most strongly about, while ensuring that certain issues were discussed should the interviewee move off topic. Individual guides were prepared for each interviewee, taking into consideration their experiences with public financing, but at a minimum included the following for all interviewees:

- In your personal experience, do you think the public financing program in your jurisdiction has helped level the playing field?
- Do you think it has helped get minorities and Latinos to run for office? To be elected to office?
- What do you think some of the pros and cons may be for Latino candidates?
- What do you think are the greatest benefits of participating in the program? Greatest downsides to participating in the program?
- Are there any changes to the program you think will improve it?
- What do you think the expenditure and contribution limits?
- Do you think such a program could work for higher levels of office?

Elected official interviewees were also asked:

- When running for office, what weighed in your considerations regarding public funds?
- Do you think matching funds benefited your opponents in the primary election?
- Do you think your political experience/lack of political experience before your first run for office played a role in your decision to participate/not participate in the public financing program?

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